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An Overview: Geopolitics and Literature
When the vast, multinational Soviet empire collapsed in 1991 , the geopolitical structure it had struggled to maintain for most of the 20 111 century often by means of brutal repression and forced remobilization of entire populations -

proved itself in the eyes of many to be fatally out of sync with the

epochal norm of the nation-state . By the end of the 18 111 century, people in many
parts of the world had begun to "imagine themselves" as nations and to organize
politically into states whose primary function would be to protect, nurture, and
(in a kind of Romantic feedback loop) vindicate the existence of the "people"
as a "nation." In Eastern Europe, movements towards national self-determination began somewhat later -

towards the end of the 19' 11 century -

and were .

notoriously aborted or suppressed by violent redistribution of power and territory in the aftermath of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution. As is well
known, as the world's first self-proclaimed communist state, the Soviet Union
was ideologically committed to uniting the "workers of the world" on the basis
of class interests rather than narrow ethnic or national identity; in practice,
the USSR pursued different strategies in different periods to accommodate
and/or manipulate the tension within its far-flung borders between national
self-awareness and self-expression versus a collective, Soviet, supranational
notion of belonging. It is axiomatic to Slavic Studies that throughout the 20 111
century, fictional literature and even academic histories of literature played
a crucial role in articulating the contours of national and "Soviet" identity. 1
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At first, it seemed that the cultural and political importance of literature
in Russia and Eastern Europe would be simply swept aside by the collapse
of an ideology that relied on writers (and to some degree filmmakers and other
artists) to reflect its version ofreality to the masses. Even more damaging to the
weight and prestige of serious literature, of course, was the abrupt introduction
of free market capitalism into the formerly socialist countries, which (along with
the rapid rise of new communication technologies) allowed people to purchase
and consume entertainment in new ways. It would be a mistake, however, to miss
the resurgence of literature 's significance in the current conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Both "serious literature" and the popular "literary
landscape" in Putin's Russia, on the one hand, and in contemporary Ukraine,
on the other, are serving to diagnose the parameters of simmering conflict.
In what follows, this paper will outline the bifurcation of geopolitical ideologies
since 2008 into two opposed trends: in Russia, the official discourse of Putin's
third term presidency is one of civilizational identity based on a revived notion
of neo-Eurasianism that draws heavily on the "ethnogenetic" teachings of Lev
Gurnilev for inspiration. In Ukraine, by contrast, the search for a usable national
identity is on - since the Orange Revolution of 2004, and newly stimulated
by the Euromaidan movement of 2013-2014, Ukrainians seem to sense the urgency of seizing this historical moment to define a national identity that is both
etlrno-cultural and inclusively civic. 2
What does the contorted intellectual history of geopolitics have to do with
Russia and Ukrainian literary categories today? It is useful to remind ourselves
of the relationship between geopolitics, literature, and other forms of popular
culture. In 1899, the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen coined the term
"geopolitics" to draw attention to the territorial, physical-geographical dimensions of statehood and the relations between political states (Dobbs, 21 ). Kjellen's
suggestion that the development of states can be "scientifically" understood
as a factor of territorial and resource constraints and ambitions was swiftly taken
up in academic circles in neighboring Germany in the first decades of the 20' 11
century. For instance, the influential teachings of Frederick Ratzel , a Professor
of Geography at the University of Leipzig, posited a view of geopolitics that
still characterizes - at its most simplistic level - the reputation of geopolitics
as a hardheaded, non-sentimental, that's-the-way-the-world-works approach.
According to Ratzel, the state can be compared to a super-organism, a quasi-
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biological entity with an instinct for self-preservation and self-perpetuation.
The state therefore ceaselessly seeks to expand its "living space" in order to ensure adequate territory and resources for growth. Since other strong and healthy
states are engaged in the same struggle for existence, geopolitical dynamics
on a global scale resemble an endless tug-of-war, with various states either
in stages of growth or decline. In the interwar years, the idea of geopolitics fueled some of the most aggressive ideological regimes in Europe and elsewhere:
Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Germany all used a geopolitical discourse of scarcity
(on the one hand) and the need to secure physical, territorial resources as a way
of mobilizing and militarizing in the 1930s (Dobbs, 25). In Japan, the remarkable association of a leading German geopolitical thinker, Karl Haushofer, and
his Japanese colleagues led to the establishment of the Japanese Association
for Geopolitics and the Geopolitics School at the University of Kyoto in 1930s
(Dobbs, 28). Haushofer was deeply interested in Japan (where he stayed from
1908-1910) and one of his most important books was a study of Japanese
territorial strategies in the Pacific ( Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans ( 1924 )).
Ultimately, the association of geopolitics with the triumph ofNazism in Germany
led to the nearly complete eclipse of the term (and its academic provinces) after
WW II. In most of Europe and the United States, geopolitics was discredited
as an intellectual discipline and rarely invoked as a strategic term until the
closing decade of the Cold War.
During the same post-war decades, geopolitika fell into disfavor in the Soviet Union. Yet, despite official disapproval, one Russian academic continued
to actively develop his own elaborate theory of how geographical environment,
ethnic identity, and the "organism" of the state conform to inalienable "natural"
laws of birth, growth, maturity, and decline. The Soviet Union's most important
geopolitical theorist was none other than Lev N ikolaevich Gumilev, the only son
of two of Russia's most renowned poets, Anna Akhmatova (1889-1966) and
Nikolai Gumilev (1886-1921). 3 Lev Gumilev was born on October 12, 1912.
His father was executed on suspicions of his allegiance to the Whites in 1921.
Lev Gumilev's relationship to his famous mother was fraught throughout his
life, but the fact of their relationship, in the context of Russian-Soviet culture,
obviously lent additional cache to Gumilev's astounding rise to prominence
as a major thinker in late Soviet and post-Soviet intellectual circles. In 1929,
he moved with Akhmatova to .Leningrad. In 1933, Gumilev was arrested for
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the fir·st ti· me; 111
·
·gJ t of the purges, he was arrested again and sent
19 3 8 at t 11e 1ie1 1
'
lly
spending
5 years in brutal conditions in the Soviet
to do 11ar d la bor even 1ua
al·ct·IC. l-I e was re' 1eas ed 1·11 1945 ' only to be arrested again in 1949, this time with
ars (commuted only in 1956). In total, he spent 13 years
a sen tence o f tel 1 Ye '
· ti1e gu lag . According to Gumilev himself and those who knew him best,
m
he regarded his time in camps as a kind of laboratory for observing humanity
and developing his ideas (Bassin, 11 ). In Gumilev's theory, the powerful surge
of"force or energy" that catapults certain individuals into crucial civilizational-historical roles -

what he called passionarnost' -

arrives out of the blue

(literally, through a form of cosmic energy) in unexpected moments.
After 1956, LJntil his death in 1992, Lev Gumilev labored somewhat at the
margins of official academia, as a research associate (starshii nauchnyi sotrud-

nik) on the Faculty of Geography at Leningrad State University (Bassin, 15).
In almost all accounts, he is described as a touchy, irascible, abrasive character;
in addition to the terrible weight of his past experiences, he also could (and did)
complain of his status as a "scholarly and political outcast" (Bassin, 17). Nevertheless, in the last few years of his life, during Gorbachev's perestroika, his
maverick theory of ethnogenesis and civili zational clasl1es moved increasingly
into the respectable mainstream. Tn the 2000s, since Putin has established his
increasingly long reign as leader of Russia, Gumilev's theories of how environment, ethnicity, and civilizational cycles "inevitably" fit together have become
ubiquitous in Russia. In it is safe to say the Gumilevian theory provides a fundamental (pseudo-) scholarly pillar in Putin's official geopolitical ideology. His
influence extends far beyond what he himself might have intended- or beyond
how he intended his ideas to be interpreted. Gumilev's ideas have spread through
contemporary Russian geopolitics and popular culture like an all-encompassing
fog - The Gumilev Mystique, as Bassin calls it. 4
Why is the "Gurnilev mystique" important for our understanding of contemporary Russian popular literature, and the sharp contrast between today's
Russian fiction and recent works by contemporary Ukrainian novelists? One
might have expected a case of "clash of opposites" -

in a time of direct po-

litical tensions, Ukrainian authors will seek to write "against Russia." Instead,
as I will argue below, the literary cultures of the two countries on Ukraine's leading writers of "serious" literature -

if one focuses

reflect two strikingly

disconnected realms of geopolitical imagination. In Russia, we see the Putin
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regime's geopolitical representations of self and other projected into a particular
way of spatializing boundaries and dangers. These spatialized tropes (e.g. ostrov

Krym is actually nash), are then reflected everywhere in mass media, cinema,
novels, cartoons, schoolbooks, etc. In Ukraine, one would expect to see the same
hierarchy of formal, practical, and popular geopolitics, i.e. formal geopolitical
representations of self and other (e.g. is Ukraine "other" to Europe, or part of
Europe) are projected into practical notions of how identity and territorial-political boundaries should overlap; at the level of popular imagination, geopolitical
assumptions are recreated in film, toys, novels, etc. 5 As we shall see, in Russia
today, the overwhelmingly dominant geopolitical vision is one of a distinctive
Eurasian, civilizational identity with corresponding claims to supranational territorial and resource interests. This vision is reflected in the plots and settings and
characters of a series of widely read novelists. Ukrainian novelists do not write
"against" this vision. They invoke fictional worlds with national, rather than
civilizational, boundaries, and their fictional protagonists use different criteria
to establish a "home" for a distinctly Ukrainian sense of identity.

Gumilev and the "Civilizational Turn" in Russia
Like all grand, synthetic, and ultimately fairly malleable theories, Gumilev's
theory of ethnogenesis is made up of many component parts, some of which even
seem to contract each other. Since a detailed account of his theory is beyond
the scope of one paper, the following synopsis can only provide a sense of the
theory's appeal (to some) and its pernicious (to others) flaws. There are three
key components to the theory of ethnogenesis. First is the fact of the ethnos .
(ethnies, plural) as the fundamental category of human identity and belonging. lt is important to note Gumilev's contention that the ethnos is not at all
the same thing as race - the constitution of an ethnos has nothing inherently
to do with skin color, bone structure, or other racially determined features.
The main point of an ethnos is its "behavioral stereotype." ln other words,
the ethnies arise, completely organically and naturally, as the human product
of a given landscape or environment. Over biological-geological eras, human
collectives have acquired ways of being, thinking, and behaving that are shaped
by, and adapted to, the particular natural environment in which they emerged.
In this way, says Gurnilev, ethnicity is a "biophysical reality" (Bassin, 28), and
" ... ethnic belonging, which manifests itself in the human consciousness, is not
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a product of this consciousness. It obviously reflects a dimension of the nature
of a person that lies much deeper; [it is] a biological dimension located beyond
consciousness and psychology, on the boundaries of the physiological.»!> Thus,
in Gumilev's understanding, ethnic belonging is passed on from generation
to generation genetically; yet the emphasis is not on the genetic transmission
of basic phenotypical traits (hair color, eye shape, skin color, etc.), but on something much more enigmatic and glorious - the reproduction'. through generations of a collective's distinct way of being, of a sense of primordial belonging,
an ethnic "behavioral stereotype" that separates svoi from drugiie. Gumilev was
necessarily fuzzy on the exact way in which a certain "ethnic" stamp to cultural
behavior could be passed on genetically. On the other hand, it was precisely
the daring challenge to Soviet dogma about the entirely social construction
of human personality that held so much appeal. In the late Soviet Union, after
three decades of Lysenkoism, biological explanations of human behavior had
enormous "underground" appeal. 7
The second key concept in Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis is the idea
ofpassionarnost '.He needed to explain what propels the emergence and flourishing of a given ethnos at a given moment in history. After all , in the grand
scheme of things, the world's peoples (ethnies) all undergo an inevitable life cycle: they are born, they arise and flourish, and then eventually decline, ultimately
lost to history. The life cycle of an ethnos is organic and inevitable, according
to Gumilev, and yet some factor must be responsible for jolting a given ethnos
into a phase of active expansion, strength, and power. In The Gumilev Mystique,
Mark Bassin repeats the exotic origins of Gumilev 's passionarnost' idea (which
came to him as he lay in appalling conditions on the floor of an overcrowded
prison cell), and provides a full account of the idea's development, always
in productive tension with official Soviet dogmas of the time. The trope of the
"eureka moment" in the gulag among scientists and artists who survived their
terms - has appeared in other memoirs that are still slowly being uncovered. 8

Passionarnost' is a quality that animates the activity of certain etlmies; in particular, it may inhere in those extraordinary individuals who goad the development of their ethnos as it rises and expands its territory. If the initial inspiration
for positing the impact of "passionary" leaders - certain extraordinary men
who lead their ethnic collective into an era of high activity - came from the
1930s myth of the "new Soviet man" (a dynamic, extraordinary agent of social
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progress), then in subsequent, post-gulag decades, Gumilev settled on very
different explanation for "passionary" energy. By the 1960s, he had determined
that the source of "passionary" energy on earth must also have biogeophysical
origins - following Vernadskii, he followed the logic that we "live in a great
galaxy, which has an effect on us, as do all the other factors determining the
development of the biosphere" (Bassin, 49). Passionarnost' is transmitted
through the cosmos, and in certain times and places, a whole ethnos may be
subject to the kind of cosmic radiation that stimulates growth and activity. This
particular aspect ofGumilev's theory has been most appreciated for its intrinsic
appeal as pop cultural motif - in science fiction stories, movies, and games,
the triumphant group is infused with cosmic energy, or lead into battle by a hero
who has been infused with galactic passionary energy. 9
Finally, Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis has implications that explicitly
contribute to the resurgence of Eurasianist ideology in post-Soviet Russia.
According to Gumilev's "scientific" theory, ethnies exist in relationships to other
ethnies that are inherently complementary, or, on the contrary, incompatible.
This is not a matter of political will, social constructions of identity, or conscious
education of the masses. One of the most pernicious aspects ofGumilev's theory
is that it claims to be biological and objective - it purports to describe processes
that can be understood and used for strategic purposes, but are not subject to moral censure or directed social change. This aspect ofGumilevian theory has also
been very useful for the new formulation of Russia's geopolitical imperative.
The idea that the world is made up of multiple civilizations, and that these
ciyilizations will clash (on a civilizational, rather than national level) has a long
history. Logically, civilizational discourse will become stronger when former
or alternative identity frameworks are weak or missing. At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, Alexander Blok famously captured the impulse of a Eurasian
civilizational identity in his poem "Scythians" ( 1918):
MHJibOHbI - sac. Hae - TbMbl, 11 TbMbl, 11 TbMbT.
0onpo6yi1Te, cpa311TeCb C HaMl1 !
,Ua, Cl<HC[)b[ - Mb!! ,Ua, a3HaTbl - Mb!
c pacKOCblMl1 11 )l<a)J,HbfMH OLJaMH ! [... ]
The "Eurasian idea," like all forms of civilizational discourse, can be fit
to an ideological agenda and used for political purposes. 10 Several analysts have
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traced the rise of an explicit civilizational discourse in Russia since approximately 2008. Fabian Linde argues that by 2012, the overt embrace of a new
kind of "civilizational nationalism" came to characterize Putin's foreign and
domestic policy.11 Jn a nutshell, the civilizational discourse of Eurasian identity _ whereby to be "Russian" is far more than a national category, but rather
the linchpin (sterzhen) of a civilizational destiny -

is a discourse that rejects

alternative notions of Russia as a (potentially) Western or European nation.
Linde quotes one of Putin's clear and characteristic formulations of Russia's
civilizational identity in 2012:
First, we must strengthe1i Russia as a unique world civilization. We must
remember that our country has traditioi1ally always had regional diversity,
ethno-cultural and religious diversity, and over the centuries this has been
preserved, not suppressed. This diversity's continued preservation today
is not just the guarantee that Russia's statehood has a solid foundation,
but is also our great competitive advantage. No other country in the world
has such a wealth of peoples and languages .... At the same time, we are
fully justified in speaking of the key cementing role played by the Russian
language and by the Russian people and its great cu lture. 12
[n short, the "civilizational" worldview provides a basis for political action
as well as a geopolitical paradigm that is reflected, amplified, or subverted in the
sphere of cultural production. Russia today is still a nation of readers -

and

the best-selling literatme by far consists of what we might call "civilizational
soap operas." These are quasi-historical, quasi-science fictional novels whose
plots describe ethno-civilizational drama on a timescale that extends from the
ancient past to the far future. The most successful literature of this sort is written
for a young adult audience, with knowing nods to the Harry Potter formula. For
instance, Polina Voloshinova's novel Marusya (2009) follows the tumultuous
journey of the titular heroine, who is a 14-year girl in the opening scene, which
takes place on earth in the year 2020. Marusya, "a girl who always ends up
in the middle of things" [J.leBO<itrn, c KOTOpoi1 IlOCTOllHHO LITO-TO CJIY'-taeTcll] 13
is unwittingly drawn into a cosmic battle of opposing forces when she finds
an immortality bracelet in her backpack. In and of itself, it is not surprising that
a well-written cosmic fantasy of this sort would sell well -

and Marusya has

sold over 300,000 copies to date, in addition to maintaining a huge audience
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of online fans and Facebook groups. What is unusual is the development of the
"Etnogenez" literary franchise that followed this initial success.

Marusya became the first novel in wide-ranging series of "ethnogenetic"
narratives that have been commissioned and orchestrated by a Russian media
producer. 14 According to the book's promotional material, the novels in the
series, while authored by different people, all follow an overarching narrative
theme:

"Marusya is the first book in the Ethnogenetics epos, a world in which
history is driven by the actions of great passionaries, ·where fates are
determined by the will of the Universe, and where a single step can
change the course of all humanity. You will find lost worlds and their
secrets, sacred symbols, cosmic aliens, and travel through time and
space -

through the present, past, and future" (my translation). 15

If mainstream Russian literature, and the vast majority of readers who buy
these blockbusters, is willing to "buy" the magic of civilizational-nationalist
narratives, what comprises oppositional literature? For writers who categorically
reject the meta-narratives, the Gumilevian obsession with civilizational greatness, and the widely noted replacement of real news with "fake news" in the
Russian media, what new artistic resources are brought into play? The most
recent article by Mark Lipovetsky makes the case that "small forms" and "minor
genres" are back, in a 21" century, technologically-mediated iteration of what
the formalist Tynianov diagnosed a century ago. Generally, in order to reject
gqmd, teleological, historical narratives, writers "rediscover" the expressive
power of small, fragmentary, intimate forms:
"Here, in these letters, we find the most flexible and most needed phenomena that with incredible force highlighted new constructive principles:
reticence, fragmentariness, hints. The 'domestic' small form of the letter
motivated the introduction of petty detail and stylistic devices as opposed
to I in contrast to the 'grandiose' devices of the 18'11 century." 16
In the increasingly oppressive and controlled sphere of public discourse
in Putin 's Russia, non-conformist and oppositional writers have found themselves confronted with a bizarre new enemy: their own postmodernist techniques
turned against them . In other W(?rds, now that the conservative-nationalist media
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has cheerfully adopted the techniques or pastiche satire, performance arL, and
"fake news" to present the public with a certain version of' reality " artists are
seeking new mod es of "estra ngement' to counter what many ee a th most
comprehensive and ubiquitous phenomenon of mass "estrangment" since the

'Gesam1/n111stwer/; " of talinism (in Boris Groys formulation) . Lipovetsky
ana lyzes the new ema.ntic power that imbues small forms of internet poetry
and do u-theater and makes a tentative prediclion that the new' constructive
principle" -

of piecing together documentary fragments and moments of affect

(emotional punches)-will seek to invade other genres (Lipovetsky, 203). But
so far, Russian artists are relying on micro-forms as "the most flexible and most
needed phenomena" to counteract the hegemonic narratives of civilizational
geopolitics.

Oksana Zabuzhko, The Museum ofAbandoned Secrets
Is it at all justified or useful to juxtapose the rough description of the Russian
literary landscape (above) to a single recent Ukrainian novel? Oksana Zabuzhko
(b. l 960) holds the status of one of Ukraine's most acknowledged and widely
translated contemporary authors. Her writing represents a version of Ukrainian
nationalism that is antithetical to civilizational discourse, but is not reduced
to a simple "pro-European" stance. In the final section of this paper, I will argue
that The Museum ofAbandoned Secrets (My3eJ,! nmornyrnx ce1<peTiB, 2009) usefully highlights the formal differences that might characterize the gap between
two literary cultures. The formal featmes of this novel point to a completely
different set of ideological concerns and literary responses than those we have
identified in Russia. It is too early to say how the divergence between Russian
and Ukrainian literatures in the 21 ' 1 century will look from a distant perspective.
In the present moment, however, we can try to make sense ofZabuzhko's "large
form" (a novel of over 700 pages), her unusual deployment of sex scenes, her
unapologetically intellectual heroine, and the multiple voices that contribute
to the task of defining a post-Orange Revolution Ukrainian identity.
The heroine of Zabuzhko's novel is Daryna Goshchynska, a successful
investigative journalist and TV personality who came of age just as the USSR
collapsed. In the relative chaos of the 1990s, Daryna seemed to have every
advantage: fiercely intelligent and not shy about using her obvious physical
beauty, she made her way up the ranks in television, eventually producing and
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anchoring a show called Diogenes' Lantern, which exposed viewers to the
forgotten lives of "real" Ukrainian heroes. In Daryna's clear ethical vision,
heroes are men and women who withstand the pressure to conform, compromise,
or simply "forget" uncomfortable truths. Early on in the nove l, we are treated
to a full "replay" of the interview she conducts with one of her heroes -who
is also her best friend . The reader (put in the seat of the putative TV audience)
sees two women discussing the recent successful opening of the interviewee's
art exhibition. It's a utopian moment: on this channel, at least, it is possible for
a female anchor to choose as her guest and "hero" a glamorous honey-blond
in her middle-aged years, who fearlessly explains the point of"secrets": a game
that little girls used to play by burying shiny objects covered by a piece of broken glass under the dirt, so that the initiated might dig up the dirt in the right
spot and find the magical "window" onto the secret objects. We see how this
conceit has been transformed by the contemporary artist's tools into a visually
sparkling set of installations (selling well in European galleries), but also how
the whole thing is not a "conceit" at all, because the interviewer and interviewee
openly discuss the reality behind the "secrets" game (little girls watched their
grandmas burying icons and books in the ground in the 1930s and 40s). Daryna's
TV show could be envied in any progressive society: it makes discussing ideas
and seeking truth seem both natural and contagiously glamorous. Before long,
however, Daryna 's friend is mysteriously killed in a car accident, the country
as a whole lurches towards compromised elections, all-too-familiar (from Soviet
times) political and social reflexes lock into place, and all the fragile freedoms
Daryna 's generation thought they had are put into jeopardy. In a characteristic
passage, we hear Daryna's thoughts on why the "collapse of communism"
could not guarantee, in and of itself, that the new generation would grow into
a democracy:
We were well-fed, well-groomed guinea pigs, with glossy fur - those
of us who managed to find our way to the flood of money currents - we
had no instinct for danger, and that, perhaps, was the main mark of our
generation : bare as bones, armed with nothing but our parents' blessing
of go-ahead-kiddo-and-you'll-have-the-good-life; we stuck our heads
into the trap happily and with an easy heart, even with a sense of our own
relevance ; we took pride in our glossy fur, in being paid, and being paid
well - for being talented and insightful, of course what else? - and

II
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then it was too late. We went along, thinking in our naivete, that we were
shaping the new television landscape - we measured our ratings thought
up new shows, and, like children, felt unbelievably cool when we said
"in Ukrainian for the first time" - and what we really did was dance
on blood, and that unavenged, unreprised blood ate at us from the inside,
insidious as lead-laced water (272).
Instead, the novel follows the heroine and her lover (Adrian) as they move
through a painful but endlessly exhilarating landscape of"abandoned·secrets,"
trying to find and uncover the story of Adrian's great-aunt.
Daryna first becomes aware of Aunt Geltsia's existence before she meets
Adrian. At the time, she is in the process of ending an affair with her married
co-worker. When this man pulls out a photograph of five Ukrainian Insurgent
Army soldiers - a black-and-white picture taken in the forest in 1947 - Daryna
spontaneously realizes that she must find out the story of the woman (the female
UlA soldier!) in the picture. Jn this scene, she also spontaneously, against her
own will or desire, comes to organism when her co-worker moves to arouse
her. He has no inkling that her arousal has everything to do with the picture, and
nothing to do with his efforts. The extended scene of sex is conveyed entirely
from the perspective of the women's mind, which is racing beside and eventually beyond her own body, and it is ultimately a way of joining (copulating) the
heroine and the reader in a quest. We are now complicit in an act that points the
heroine towards her moral-intellectual journey:
f just could not leave the photograph with Artem. lt was mine - it had
become mine. And not just because I happened to have been thoroughly

fucked on top of it without putting up much resistance. Instead, l didn't
resist because at that moment I was possessed by someone else will.
That's what it had felt like (43).

s

Either through coincidence, or through the will of the enigmatic woman in the
photograph, Daryna meets and falls in love with the UIA soldier's great-nephew.
In a series of dreams punctuated by enabling and (this time) loving sex with
Daryna, Adrian channels the experiences of his female ancestor as she fought
against the occupying Red Army in Western Ukrainian territory after the official
end of WW II. The vivid "history" that comes to life in these dreams allows
Daryna to unravel the mystery of the UIA woman, and eventually complete

12

A Clash of Fictions: Geopolitics in Russian and Ukrainian Literature

a documentary film about her life. Here again, the way in which the bodies of the
hero and heroine desire each other as the dreams unfold serves also to connect
the reader to the reality of the lives lived by people whose history has been purposely obliterated. In Zabuzhko's novel, sex can be a kind of conduit that allows
the ghosts of the past to come back into present. The slightly phantasmagorical
return of the dead (through dreams, mediated by love) allows the protagonists
of this kind of novel to grab the chance (and the obligation) to finally expose
the "secrets" of buried national history. In this way, the dead are resurrected
from their anonymous mass graves, or from the hastily burned archives, and
someone resolves to tell their story for the next generation . Thus, Zabuzhko's
"undead" are not Zombies that we can't pacify, but memories that we are called
upon to resolve. The resolution of a difficult and intentionally obfuscated past
requires time and attention to detail, however, which is reflected in the length
of this novel and its exuberant (not without humor) evocation of material and
psychological detail.
The relatively positive arc of the story portrayed so far -

intrepid female

Ukrainian reporter manages against all odds to resurrect a tiny piece of buried history and make a documentary film -

is obviously not the whole story.

The odds are formidable, and the obstacles to achieving a genuine Ukrainian
independence are real. In one telling scene, Daryna meets her deceased friend's
powerful ex-husband for a late-night meal in a restaurant he seems to own (as
he owns many assets). Vadym has the kind of shortness of breath that afflicts
"well-nourished men past their prime;" Daryna is on the verge of tears because
she knows the topic they have met to discuss -

the introduction of a new TV

"game show" that is really a front for a sex-trafficking ring -

will not go well.

Crying's the last thing I need right now, but my nose tickles treacherously,
and I begin to breathe hard, like Vadym, hard and fast. We sit facing each
other the two of us, and snuffle like hedgehogs on a narrow path. [ .. .]
What a nasty feeling this is, to know a crime is about to happen, and not
to be able to stop it (486).
Vadym then delivers a lengthy explanation of how and why "political technologies" have come to replace the old-fashioned notion that politics are driven
by actual ideas. Jn his logic, sex-trafficking cannot be stopped, or even exposed,
because in the realm of post-Soviet politics, there is no "idea," only the "struggle
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for power" (49 I). Vadym 's elaborate speech on the "struggle for power" principle is in fact a tour de force, and could be usefully read as a quasi-intellectual
justification for the kind of victories that take place in the "Etnogenez" novels
(recall: "history is driven by great passionaries, and fates are determined by the
will of the Universe"). In Zabuzhko's handling, however, the material and
psychological details of the present and the past insist on confusing the "will
of the Universe," and Vadym's assault on Daryna 's alternative system of values
and beliefs is ultimately belittled, as "two hedgehogs snuffling past each other
on a narrow path."
To conclude, The Museum of Abandoned Secrets represents a mode of
constructing fictional worlds which differs sharply from the prevalent trend
in Russian popular literature, but also differs in form and voice from the efforts
of non-conformist Russian writers to find new impetus in "small forms." Zabuzhko's novel, like those of her compatriots Yuri Andurkhovych, Serhiy Zhadan,
and Andrei Kurkov, exists in antithesis to the "civilizational nationalism" that has
come to dominate Russian geopolitics and much of Russian mass entertainment.
It does not counter Russian "Eurasianism" with an alternative civilizational
myth; rather, Ukrainian literature today is avowedly concerned with its role
in articulating a new national identity for independent Ukraine. As several critics
have pointed out, what seems to be emerging, at least tentatively, is a vision of
a civic national identity (Ukraine for Ukrainians of many voices and ethnicities), rather than an ethno-cultural national identity that excludes non-ethnic
Ukrainians. In the meantime, we can hope that in the "clash of fictions," writers
and their readers may find inspiration for a more meaningful encounter than the
proverbial "clash of civilizations."
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Notes

2

4
5

Ukrainian scholars are well aware of the importance or national literary histories continue
to play in the 21" century (re)construction or nationhood (Pavlyshyn "Literary History" 80).
Since the so-called 01'ange Revolution protesting election fraud in Ukraine in 2004, popular
rejection of Russian political influence in Ukraine has grown, culminating in the Euromaidan
protests of 2013-2014. This article concentrates on recent (since 2008) literary phenomena
in both Russia and Ukraine.
In the first post-Soviet clecacle, and arguably well into the second, various narratives of Ukrainian nationalism have been embraced by some of the people some or the lime, but narrowly
ethno-nalionalisl conslrnctions ol' identity have been vigorously conleslccl (see Shevel "The
Baltic for 1-listorical Memory," and MacBride "Who's Afraid of Ukrainian Nationalism?"
for overviews of recent scholarship on this topic. For more on the clangers of intolerant
nationalist narratives, sec Dubasevych ("Ukraine's Sleepwalking"). For a (positive) argument on the growing support for a broadly inclusive, civic national identity, sec Pavlyshyn
("Literary H islory").
Gumilev himself did not interest himsel r with "geopolitics" at all, in the sense or practical,
contemporary ideological maneuvering. Rather, he clarified the relationship between geography, ellrnicity, and the struggle between civilizational groups in way that has been adapted
lo conle111pora1·y gcopol ilical thinking.
Mark Bassin's book provides the 1·u11est account in English ofGumilev's life and work.
The tripartite schema of geopolitical culture - as theorized by Geal'Oid 0 Tuathail - moves
from ( 1) the "formal" level of ideological imagination to (2) the "practical" level of drawing/
enacting maps lo (3) the popular level whe1e geopolitical assumptions are absorbed into
everyday images, representations and artifacts. See Dodds, 42.
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This quote can be found in Gumilev, Konels i v110v 'nachalo: Populiamye lek~lii po narodovedeniiu, Moscow, Roi' r (200 I); trnnslatcd in Bassin, 28.
See, /or instance, Howell ("The Liberal Gene").
The geneticist Vladimir Pavlovich Efroirnson, while serving a term of hard labor in the notorious Dzhezkazgan camps, later recalled a key piece in understanding the heredity of immune
responses "came to me while I was dragging a wheelbarrow to the mortar station" (Howell,
367). Genrikh Altshuller also describes his "eureka moment" in prison (see Howcll "Genrikh
Altshull er"). Of Gumilcv, a colleague wrote "his school for working out the theory of ethnogenesis on the basis of people's behavior [was in the camps]; in the camps he could observe
the full variety or Russian reality" (Bassin, 11).
Sec Mark Bassin and Irina Kotkina ("The Etnogenez Project").
Samuel 1-luntington 's 1993 article "The Clash of Civilizations" is an example of an American
political scientist's interpretation of' how civilizational identities control the global world
order.
Linde, 606.
Linde, 607; quoted from "Meeting of Council for Interelhnic Relations," August 24, 2012,
http://cn.kremlin.ru/trnnscripts/4324 .
http://loveread.ec/view_global.php?id=2370 accessed 0III0/2017 .
For detailed information on Konstantin Rylkov 's involvement in the producing the "Etnogenez" series, see Mark Bassin and Irina Kotkina.
Mapyrn - ncp1.1m1 1c1111ra :moca «ET11orc11e3», MM pa, r,ne 11cTop1110 Beptna-r noCTynKtt m:nmmx
11accM0Hap11en, r,ne cyf\u6b1onpe11eJ1i1eT1.1om1 Bcene1111ot1, r,ne O,!\HH-CAHllCTJJe1111u1ti rnar cnoco6e1111JMe1111Tb pa3BHT11e llCero '1enoBe,1ecTua. Bae >I<AYT3ffre1>i1111-1u1e Ml1pb111 HX ce1cpeTb1,
cmcpanbllble npHWeJlbllbl 113 l<OCMOCa, nyTeUJCCTllHR BO llJlCMCJIH H npocTpa11c'J'Be - ll 11aCTOilll[Ce, npo111J1oc, fl 6y,nyu1ee. http://lovcread.ec/v iew_global.
Tynianov, Yuri i. Poelika. lstoriia /ileral111J'· Kina IE. Todd es, A. Chudakov, and M. Chudakova
(Eels.). Moskva: Nauka, 1977. P. 265. Translated and quolecl in Lipovelsky, 191.
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